Spain sets own rules of engagement for Libya mission

Congress on Tuesday voted overwhelmingly in favor of Spanish participation in the military intervention in Libya, four days after the government unilaterally decided to join the international mission.

In theory, the Cabinet and Congress should have agreed to identical conditions, yet an analysis of both documents, which EL PAÍS had access to, shows some discrepancies. For instance, the Cabinet last Friday approved the "use of Spanish military bases by foreign forces acting under the umbrella of the resolutions (UN Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973)."

But this point was left out of the congressional vote, so as not to set a precedent by asking deputies for their permission to allow use of the Rota and Morón bases, a decision that falls exclusively to the government.

There are also new limitations with regard to the nature of the mission. Four F-18s are authorized to enforce the no-fly zone as set out in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Resolution 1973, but not "to adopt all necessary measures to protect civilians and areas populated by civilians under threat in Libya," as paragraph 4 of the same resolution states. France has used this clause to destroy tanks that were attacking Benghazi, a move that the Spanish members of the mission, though equipped and trained for it, will not be allowed to make.

There is one last limitation to the Spanish mission. Without anyone asking it to, the government has decided to put a one-month limit on Spain's contribution of four F-18 fighter jets and a B-707 refueling aircraft. It has also set a three-month limit on the participation of its frigate Méndez Núñez, the submarine Tramontana and the maritime patrol aircraft CN-235 in the naval blockade that NATO decided to launch yesterday morning. These deadlines can be extended, and will require the government to seek new authorization from Congress - this time before the Defense Committee, not in a plenary session - but in circumstances that could be far more difficult than those existing today.

Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero did not offer any explanations for this time limit. He simply said that it was "an initial period" and that, if the situation requires it, the government will go back to Congress to request permission for an extension. "Action will have to be taken [in Libya] until there are guarantees that the population is protected," he stated.

Government sources said military leaders were responsible for establishing the one-month limit on the Spanish air mission, but all the armed forces officials that EL PAÍS talked to seemed surprised about it. It certainly is not to be found in the UN resolution. None would dare assert that the deadline can be met and still have a concrete result on the ground to show for it.

Why did the government impose these limitations on itself? The key may lie in Zapatero's address to Congress. If, on Friday, he announced that Spain would make "an important contribution" to the international intervention, by Tuesday he was calling it a "prudent" one.

One might be forgiven for suspecting political motives. If things go as planned, the Spanish fighters will be back in Spain on April 22, exactly one month before local and regional elections.

The Defense Ministry claims that military chiefs estimate a month to be time enough to impose the no-fly zone, which Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, considered already in place by Sunday, less than 24 hours after the airstrikes began. But it's one thing for none of Gaddafi's planes or helicopters to be in the air at the present time, and another for them not to do so once the coalition forces have gone home. It would be hard to explain it to public opinion if the F-18s were forced to return to Libya shortly after coming home in the event of the Libyan regime recovering control over its airspace.

The policing mission over Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a no-fly zone was also imposed, lasted eight years, from 1994 to 2002. The only way to avoid this kind of timeframe is to destroy Libya's entire aviation now, even if it does not take to the sky. But it is unclear whether Resolution 1973 authorizes that kind of action.

It is also possible that there are budgetary concerns behind the decision to put a time limit on the deployment of the F-18s, which cost 10 million eurosa month without counting the possibility of losing one or more of them during the mission. The naval deployment to enforce the UN arms embargo is more economical, and also less controversial from a political point of view. Yet its effectiveness is more than doubtful; Gaddafi has enough weapons right now to resist for months, and it is a well-known fact that his mercenaries - and probably his military supplies - arrive by land rather than sea, through countries such as Niger and Chad, which share thousands of kilometers of land border with Libya that nobody patrols. That is why the coalition has raided airports in the south of the country, very far from the area where the rebels and government forces are facing off.

In reality, the one-month limit on Spain's air mission is the result of a political calculation: the coalition hopes that in that interval of time, the Libyan sectors that still support Gaddafi will understand that the cost of keeping him in power is too high and that they will decide to get rid of him.

The idea is to induce an internal coup within the regime itself, and to encourage a dialogue between the future authorities of Tripoli and the National Transition Council headquartered in Benghazi. If this event does not occur within the space of a month, the international coalition will have to consider new options, even if the UN resolution expressly prohibits the presence of foreign troops on Libyan soil.

Maintaining nothing more than a no-fly zone and a naval blockade could help consolidate the partition of the country into two of the three traditional territories that form Libya, Tripolitania in the west and Cyrenaica in the east, with a desert-like southern region that would be out of the control of either one of these two areas, and become a haven for Al Qaeda. And this particular scenario would be even less desirable that perpetuating a dictator like Gaddafi in power.